Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information

DOI10.1007/s10479-015-1920-7zbMath1348.91062OpenAlexW805819252WikidataQ59472069 ScholiaQ59472069MaRDI QIDQ338910

Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel

Publication date: 7 November 2016

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1920-7

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumCournot oligopolynoncooperative gamescompetitive equilibriumminority gameprisoner's dilemma\(n\)-player dynamic gamesbelief-distorted Nash equilibrium (BDNE)common ecosystemdistorted informationgames with a continuum of playerspre-BDNEself-verification of beliefssubjective equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Discrete-time games (91A50) Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18) Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Linear quadratic game of exploitation of common renewable resources with inherent constraints ⋮ Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs ⋮ Random Nash equilibrium ⋮ New results on the existence of open loop Nash equilibria in discrete time dynamic games via generalized Nash games ⋮ A model for partial Kantian cooperation

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