Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications

DOI10.3982/TE4177zbMath1485.91082OpenAlexW3211216912MaRDI QIDQ3390540

Huaxia Zeng, Ujjwal Kumar, Sonal Yadav, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 24 March 2022

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4177

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designstrategic votinglocal incentive constraintsstategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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