Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization

DOI10.3982/TE3243zbMath1485.91011OpenAlexW3211228067MaRDI QIDQ3390541

Paulo Barelli, John Duggan

Publication date: 24 March 2022

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3243

zbMATH Keywords

existencestochastic gamessubgame-perfect equilibriumpublic randomizationinfinite-action games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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