Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance

DOI10.3982/TE4257zbMath1485.91161OpenAlexW3127963604MaRDI QIDQ3390542

Lars Ehlers, Battal Doğan

Publication date: 24 March 2022

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4257

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptanceschool choicecardinal minimal instabilitystability comparisons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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