Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
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Publication:3392116
DOI10.1287/opre.1070.0431zbMath1167.91357OpenAlexW2162885967MaRDI QIDQ3392116
Publication date: 13 August 2009
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0431
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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