When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1405zbMath1169.91419OpenAlexW62932583MaRDI QIDQ3394931

Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 11 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art32

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ Manipulation via capacities revisited

Cites Work

• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem

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