BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002200zbMath1167.91359MaRDI QIDQ3395226

Juana Santamaria-Garcia

Publication date: 24 August 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

learningstochastic stabilitybargainingbest responseconvention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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