AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002170zbMath1167.91360MaRDI QIDQ3395228

Pär Torstensson

Publication date: 24 August 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriamultilateral bargaining\(n\)-person bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative bargaining of \(N \geq 3\) players
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an \(n\)-person bargaining game
• A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
• Another \(n\)-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium
• Rationalizability and equilibrium in \(N\)-person sequential bargaining
• An \(N\)-person pure bargaining game
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers
• A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Multilateral Bargaining

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