Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1362zbMath1170.91310OpenAlexW2035390339MaRDI QIDQ3398204

Michael D. Ryall, José S. Penalva

Publication date: 26 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1362

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

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