Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1363zbMath1170.91424OpenAlexW1968689576MaRDI QIDQ3398205

Gorkem Celik

Publication date: 26 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1363

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

Mechanism design with collusive supervision

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