The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
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Publication:3398212
DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1399zbMath1170.91359OpenAlexW3021844612MaRDI QIDQ3398212
Publication date: 26 September 2009
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1399
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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