Organizational power: should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0189-XzbMath1349.91185OpenAlexW3123406331MaRDI QIDQ339917

Friedel Bolle, Philipp E. Otto

Publication date: 11 November 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0189-x

zbMATH Keywords

employee contributionhierarchical delegationpayment differentiationprincipal-agent modelspublic good participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (1)

Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits

Cites Work

• Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods
• Of coordinators and dictators: a public goods experiment
• INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENT

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