The airport problem with capacity constraints

DOI10.1007/s10058-016-0191-3zbMath1349.91174OpenAlexW2413351352MaRDI QIDQ339922

Boram Park, Youngsub Chun

Publication date: 11 November 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0191-3

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueaxiomatic characterizationairport problems with capacity constraintssequential equal contributions rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Fair ride allocation on a line

Cites Work

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• Some non-superadditive games, and their Shapley values, in the talmud
• Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
• The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited
• Serial Cost Sharing
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
• NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS

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