Rational expectations can preclude trades

DOI10.1007/978-4-431-77784-7_6zbMath1183.91089OpenAlexW2025645911MaRDI QIDQ3400027

Takashi Matsuhisa, Ryuichiro Ishikawa

Publication date: 18 January 2010

Published in: Advances in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-77784-7_6

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectations equilibriumcommon knowledgeno trade theoremex ante Pareto optimum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• Lattice structure of knowledge and agreeing to disagree
• ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach.
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Rationalizable trade
• On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
• Common beliefs and the existence of speculative trade
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information

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