Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade

DOI10.1162/QJEC.122.2.569zbMath1179.91121OpenAlexW2107223856WikidataQ56701671 ScholiaQ56701671MaRDI QIDQ3401198

Nathan Nunn

Publication date: 29 January 2010

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686801

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (8)

Assignment reversals: trade, skill allocation and wage inequality ⋮ Economic policy uncertainty, contracting frictions and imports sourcing decisions ⋮ Holdups and overinvestment in capital markets ⋮ Technology advantage, terms of trade, and pattern of trade ⋮ Dynamic inefficiency in decentralized capital markets ⋮ Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity ⋮ APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY AND INCOME DIFFERENCES ⋮ Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions

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