EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED
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Publication:3402027
DOI10.1142/S0219198909002248zbMath1190.91113OpenAlexW2100635147MaRDI QIDQ3402027
Publication date: 2 February 2010
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002248
Cites Work
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- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
- On the existence of fair matching algorithms
- Refined inequalities for stable marriage
- Procedurally fair and stable matching
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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