A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
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Publication:3402029
DOI10.1142/S0219198909002261zbMath1190.91021OpenAlexW2138324664MaRDI QIDQ3402029
Publication date: 2 February 2010
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002261
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