A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002376zbMath1190.91015OpenAlexW2022034137MaRDI QIDQ3402040

Juan Carlos Cesco

Publication date: 2 February 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002376

zbMATH Keywords

existence theoremtransferable utility gamessocially stable core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• Socially structured games
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments

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