Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00567.xzbMath1197.91152MaRDI QIDQ3406033

Axel Anderson, Lones Smith

Publication date: 12 February 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment ⋮ Sorting expertise ⋮ POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS ⋮ A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result ⋮ Job market signaling and employer learning ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Incentives and the structure of teams ⋮ Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships ⋮ Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts ⋮ JOB MATCHING WITHIN AND ACROSS FIRMS

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