A Hardcore Lemma for Computational Indistinguishability: Security Amplification for Arbitrarily Weak PRGs with Optimal Stretch

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_15zbMath1274.94098OpenAlexW1600808341MaRDI QIDQ3408197

Ueli M. Maurer, Stefano Tessaro

Publication date: 24 February 2010

Published in: Theory of Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_15

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items

Nonuniform Indistinguishability and Unpredictability Hardcore Lemmas: New Proofs and Applications to Pseudoentropy ⋮ Programmable distributed point functions ⋮ A tight computational indistinguishability bound for product distributions ⋮ Unifying leakage models: from probing attacks to noisy leakage ⋮ Distinguishing two probability ensembles with one sample from each ensemble ⋮ Amplifying the security of functional encryption, unconditionally

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