Rationality in the Full-Information Model

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_24zbMath1274.94073OpenAlexW1492873056MaRDI QIDQ3408207

Ronen Gradwohl

Publication date: 24 February 2010

Published in: Theory of Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_24

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items

Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Against Independent Rational Adversaries

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