Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00681.xzbMath1127.91019OpenAlexW1643827620MaRDI QIDQ3410711

Thomas Tröger, Rod Garratt

Publication date: 30 November 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13506/1/42.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyresalespeculationstandard auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (20)

Auctions with entry and resale ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions ⋮ Speculation in procurement auctions ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort ⋮ First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders ⋮ Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study ⋮ Auctions with synergy and resale ⋮ Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale ⋮ Auctions with resale and bargaining power ⋮ Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects ⋮ Optimal fees in internet auctions ⋮ English auctions with resale: an experimental study ⋮ Auctions with speculators: an experimental study ⋮ The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle ⋮ Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions ⋮ Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment

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