Checking before output may not be enough against fault-based cryptanalysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3417029
DOI10.1109/12.869328zbMath1300.94101OpenAlexW2144952508MaRDI QIDQ3417029
Publication date: 9 January 2007
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Computers (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5be314fb30d315d7e85229c9a4fe6794508bd040
Related Items (22)
A Secure and Efficient Implementation of the Quotient Digital Signature Algorithm (qDSA) ⋮ \textsf{Transform} without \textsf{encode} is not sufficient for SIFA and FTA security: a case study ⋮ Safe-error attacks on SIKE and CSIDH ⋮ Preventing Fault Attacks Using Fault Randomization with a Case Study on AES ⋮ Scalar recoding and regular \(2^w\)-ary right-to-left EC scalar multiplication algorithm ⋮ Complete reverse-engineering of AES-like block ciphers by SCARE and FIRE attacks ⋮ New fault attacks using Jacobi symbol and application to regular right-to-left algorithms ⋮ Statistical Fault Attacks on Nonce-Based Authenticated Encryption Schemes ⋮ Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates ⋮ DEFAULT: cipher level resistance against differential fault attack ⋮ A third is all you need: extended partial key exposure attack on CRT-RSA with additive exponent blinding ⋮ Polar differential power attacks and evaluation ⋮ Fault attacks on nonce-based authenticated encryption: application to Keyak and Ketje ⋮ Memory-Constrained Implementations of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Co-Z Coordinate Representation ⋮ Binary Huff Curves ⋮ Fault Analysis Study of IDEA ⋮ Securing RSA against Fault Analysis by Double Addition Chain Exponentiation ⋮ Error detection and error correction procedures for the advanced encryption standard ⋮ Fault template attacks on block ciphers exploiting fault propagation ⋮ Security of hedged Fiat-Shamir signatures under fault attacks ⋮ Exponent Recoding and Regular Exponentiation Algorithms ⋮ Square Always Exponentiation
This page was built for publication: Checking before output may not be enough against fault-based cryptanalysis
