Power, Embedded Games, and Coalition Formation

DOI10.1080/00222500500328928zbMath1103.91010OpenAlexW2018739893MaRDI QIDQ3417452

David Willer, Casey Borch

Publication date: 29 January 2007

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00222500500328928

zbMATH Keywords

networkspowercoalition formationrational choice theoryexchange theoryruling class

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Non-cooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Sequential Equilibria
• A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations
• Optimal policies for the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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