Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
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Publication:3418482
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.xzbMath1152.91428OpenAlexW2016245783WikidataQ62016801 ScholiaQ62016801MaRDI QIDQ3418482
Shurojit Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Sushil Bikhchandani, Ahuva Mu'alem, Arunava Sen, Noam Nisan
Publication date: 5 February 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/5052/
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