A TIME-CONSISTENT AGREEMENT IN AN INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON POLLUTION AND TRADE

DOI10.1142/S0219198906000977zbMath1197.91156MaRDI QIDQ3421631

Elena Escudero, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Francisco Cabo

Publication date: 7 February 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamestransboundary pollutiontrade and environmentcooperative and non-cooperative gamesdynamic individual rationalitytime-consistent agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility ⋮ Hierarchical differential game between manufacturer, retailer, and bank ⋮ Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications ⋮ A differential game of industrial pollution management considering public participation ⋮ A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities

Cites Work

• Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• Transitional Impacts of Environmental Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model
• Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution