The role of commitment in repeated games

DOI10.1080/02331930600815991zbMath1156.91318OpenAlexW2064364377MaRDI QIDQ3426231

Julio González-Díaz, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado

Publication date: 8 March 2007

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331930600815991

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationrepeated gamesfolk theoremsunilateral commitmentsdelegation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games ⋮ Transfers, contracts and strategic games ⋮ Essential collections for equilibrium concepts ⋮ Commitment games

Cites Work

• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
• Sequential Equilibria
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation

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