Stable solutions for multiple scenario cost allocation games with partial information
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Publication:342800
DOI10.1007/s10479-014-1755-7zbMath1406.91214OpenAlexW2089927056MaRDI QIDQ342800
D. V. Borrero, Miguel A. Hinojosa, Amparo M. Mármol
Publication date: 18 November 2016
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1755-7
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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