Monitoring and incentives in a supply chain: an agency-theoretic perspective

DOI10.1080/02522667.2006.10699684zbMath1179.90012OpenAlexW2144218265MaRDI QIDQ3429063

Juimin Hsiao, Changchun Tsai

Publication date: 30 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02522667.2006.10699684

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelsupply chaincompensation planinformation asymmetricmulti-incentive mechanismmulti-principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Cites Work

• Information Sharing in a Supply Chain: A Note on its Value when Demand Is Nonstationary
• Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Incentives and Information
• Some two-echelon style-goods inventory models with asymmetric market information
• Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains: A game theory approach

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