Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.08.004zbMath1368.91040arXiv1501.00882OpenAlexW3124074761MaRDI QIDQ343113

Wolfgang Kuhle, Dominik Grafenhofer

Publication date: 25 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00882

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectioncoordination gamesprimary signalssecondary signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Communication, timing, and common learning
• On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
• Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Information at equilibrium
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
• Coordination and delay in global games
• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Contagion
• Coordinated action in the electronic mail game

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