Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
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Publication:343116
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.09.001zbMath1368.91154OpenAlexW2336900194MaRDI QIDQ343116
Publication date: 25 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/VUECON-16-00005.pdf
Mirrlees tax problemnonlinear income taxationpolitical economy of taxationredistributive taxationvoting over tax schedules
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