Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining
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Publication:343141
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.06.003zbMath1368.91107OpenAlexW2283044280MaRDI QIDQ343141
Bram Driesen, Michele Lombardi, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 25 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/14388584/6233113.pdf
bargainingsubjective expected utilityChoquet expected utilitycomparative risk aversioncomparative uncertainty aversion
Related Items (2)
On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
Cites Work
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