A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
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Publication:343234
DOI10.1007/S00493-014-2979-5zbMath1363.05001OpenAlexW2610212012MaRDI QIDQ343234
Elchanan Mossel, Miklós Z. Rácz
Publication date: 25 November 2016
Published in: Combinatorica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00493-014-2979-5
Related Items (4)
Probabilistic view of voting, paradoxes, and manipulation ⋮ The probability of intransitivity in dice and close elections ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Distance restricted manipulation in voting
Cites Work
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