STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
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Publication:3444821
DOI10.1142/S0219198906001090zbMath1274.91299OpenAlexW2154647435MaRDI QIDQ3444821
Publication date: 5 June 2007
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001090
strategic equilibriumcontinuous random selectionpurification of equilibriaendowment gamespartial disposabilitypartially consumable withholdings
Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Cites Work
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