ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198906001156zbMath1274.91049OpenAlexW1967552744MaRDI QIDQ3444828

Mathieu Martin, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 5 June 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001156

zbMATH Keywords

stability setcorevoting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Choosing from a tournament
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Consistent Voting Systems

This page was built for publication: ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES