A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES

DOI10.1142/S021919890600117XzbMath1274.91088OpenAlexW2091158965MaRDI QIDQ3444830

Alexander Zimper

Publication date: 5 June 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919890600117x

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitydominance solutionsnice games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Choquet rationality
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge

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