GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT

DOI10.1142/S0219198906001181zbMath1274.91290OpenAlexW2040393075MaRDI QIDQ3444831

Dongsoo Shin, Sungho Yun

Publication date: 5 June 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001181

zbMATH Keywords

principal agentinformation gatheringpartially informed agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Ignorance in agency problems
• All-or-nothing information control
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem

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