DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY

DOI10.1142/S021919890600120XzbMath1274.91078MaRDI QIDQ3444833

Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

Publication date: 5 June 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencydynamic gamemarket attribution rulenatural duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Efficiency of dynamic quantity competition: A remark on Markovian equilibria
• Selection in dynamic entry games
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
• EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION

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