THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198906001211zbMath1274.91074MaRDI QIDQ3444834

Richard H. Stockbridge, Ziyu Zheng

Publication date: 5 June 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumNash equilibriumdifferential gamenoncooperative gamedynamic gamestopping gamerandomized strategymixed strategypedestrian principlerational prediction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of stochastic analysis (to PDEs, etc.) (60H30)

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