Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
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Publication:3446417
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00735.xzbMath1201.91084OpenAlexW2114861062WikidataQ56852500 ScholiaQ56852500MaRDI QIDQ3446417
Mark Allen Satterthwaite, Artyom A. Shneyerov
Publication date: 14 June 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00735.x
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Matching models (91B68)
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