Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_5zbMath1440.91020arXiv1503.00340OpenAlexW2752469958MaRDI QIDQ3448773

Koushik Kar, Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar

Publication date: 27 October 2015

Published in: Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.00340

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

Related Items (5)

Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing ⋮ Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands
• Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Envy-free pricing with general supply constraints for unit demand consumers
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Envy-Free Pricing with Metric Substitutability
• Improved Hardness Results for Profit Maximization Pricing Problems with Unlimited Supply
• Buying Cheap Is Expensive: Approximability of Combinatorial Pricing Problems
• Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasilinear markets
• Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
• Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
• Envy-free pricing in multi-item markets

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