Penalty-Regulated Dynamics and Robust Learning Procedures in Games
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Publication:3449451
DOI10.1287/moor.2014.0687zbMath1377.91033arXiv1303.2270OpenAlexW2116718598WikidataQ60142071 ScholiaQ60142071MaRDI QIDQ3449451
Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Bruno Gaujal, Pierre Coucheney
Publication date: 4 November 2015
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.2270
Stochastic approximation (62L20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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