A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_48zbMath1404.68078OpenAlexW2272892172MaRDI QIDQ3449509

Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_48

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (5)

Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing ⋮ Coordination games on graphs ⋮ Generalized graph \(k\)-coloring games ⋮ Price of Pareto optimality in hedonic games ⋮ Topological price of anarchy bounds for clustering games on networks

Cites Work

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• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Correlation clustering
• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
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• Farsighted stability in hedonic games
• Anti-coordination Games and Stable Graph Colorings
• Coordination Games on Graphs (Extended Abstract)
• Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games
• Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics
• The Max k-Cut Game and Its Strong Equilibria
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Algorithmic Game Theory

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