Manipulation and Bribery When Aggregating Ranked Preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6zbMath1405.91141OpenAlexW2266401050MaRDI QIDQ3449524

Ying Zhu, Miroslaw Truszczynski

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_6

zbMATH Keywords

complexityPareto principlemanipulationbriberyranked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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