Winner Determination and Manipulation in Minisum and Minimax Committee Elections

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28zbMath1405.91143OpenAlexW2294076618MaRDI QIDQ3449552

Sophie Dennisen, Lisa Rey, Dorothea Baumeister

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_28

zbMATH Keywords

complexitycommittee electionswinner determinationcomputational social choicemanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)

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Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives

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