Efficient Money Burning in General Domains

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_7zbMath1358.91059OpenAlexW2189059605MaRDI QIDQ3449584

Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Tsipras, Emmanouil Zampetakis, Christos Tzamos

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105350

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Efficient money burning in general domains

Cites Work

• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Auction design with a risk averse seller
• Frugal path mechanisms
• Optimal Auction Design
• Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
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