Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters
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Publication:3449586
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_9zbMath1358.91046arXiv1409.4132OpenAlexW1485809414MaRDI QIDQ3449586
Edith Elkind, Piotr Skowron, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova
Publication date: 4 November 2015
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.4132
Related Items (6)
Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters ⋮ Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules ⋮ Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
Cites Work
- A note on a maximum \(k\)-subset intersection problem
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
- Maximum subset intersection
- Sequential voting with abstention
- Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agents
- Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
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