Excluding Braess’s Paradox in Nonatomic Selfish Routing
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Publication:3449597
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_17zbMath1358.91029OpenAlexW1853860145MaRDI QIDQ3449597
Zhuo Diao, Xiao-Dong Hu, Xu-jin Chen
Publication date: 4 November 2015
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_17
series-parallel graphBraess's paradoxmulti-commodity networknonatomic selfish routingsingle-commodity network
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