Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies

DOI10.1145/1462153.1462157zbMath1325.91023OpenAlexW2142270691MaRDI QIDQ3452198

Moshe Babaioff, Elan Pavlov, Ron Lavi

Publication date: 11 November 2015

Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1462153.1462157

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesmechanism designcombinatorial auctionsundominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

Related Items (10)

Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets ⋮ Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders ⋮ On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments ⋮ Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach

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