Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
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Publication:3452219
DOI10.1145/1538902.1538907zbMath1325.91033OpenAlexW2113529747WikidataQ56609429 ScholiaQ56609429MaRDI QIDQ3452219
Mukund Sundararajan, Tim Roughgarden
Publication date: 11 November 2015
Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1538902.1538907
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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